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Abstract. Identity management and access control are essential in the
enterprise IT landscape in order to control access to applications and
to fulfil laws or regulations. The global competition of enterprises leads
to short development cycles and fast changes of IT applications, which
requires also an error-free and quick adaption of its security. The model-
driven development of access control policies promises to cope with this
situation. This work introduces an mda-based environment for generating
access control policies. A comprehensive overview is given on the organi-
sational aspects, describing details of roles, artefacts and tools involved.
On this basis the four phases of a model-driven development process for
access control policies and their organisational aspects are presented.
Keywords:Model-driven Security, Access Control Policies, Identity Man-
agement, Model-driven Development Process
1 Introduction
In modern enterprises business processes are extensively supported by IT sys-
tems. In order to cope with competitors and to react to demands of the global
markets, adoptions of new business requirements have to be handled quickly.
This leads to concerns for the companies’ IT systems, business processes and
their security architecture [1]. On the one hand, functional business requirements
have to be implemented very fast. In order to fulfil those demands, business pro-
cess management (BPM) [2] and model-driven approaches [3,4,5] have developed
over the last years and have proven their benefits within software engineering.
On the other hand, securing IT systems, especially the access control aspect, is
still heavily based on documents without a formal and standardised structure,
at the same time exposing a gap between the business and the IT perspective:
In addition, there is a lack of adequate tools supporting the business side in ex-
pressing their security needs. Thus, the IT department, which has to implement
the business’s requirements, has to adjust both views. Typically, this is based
on a rather unstructured communication process with many phases of human
interaction which is error-prone, in the worst case resulting in an insufficiently
secured IT landscape. We propose a model-driven development process of access
control policies as an improvement of the current situation: Modelling access
control policies starts from a business perspective, when early business-focused
models of the business process are enriched with access control statements. Af-
ter this starting point a continuous refinement and transformation phase begins,
leading to access control policies for a specific security product. In this paper,
we give a comprehensive overview of this model-driven development process for
access control policies. The different phases of the development process are de-
scribed in detail and a mapping of roles, artefacts and tools to the corresponding
phases is shown. The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 the background
and related work are analysed. Organisational aspects like roles, artefacts and
tools are presented in Section 3, while the four phases of the development pro-
cess and its relation to organisational aspects are shown in Section 4. The paper
concludes with a summary and an outlook on future work in Section 5.
2 Background and Related Work
Before we discuss related work, a short overview of the work on which this pa-
per is built upon is given, touching the fields of identity management, access
control and model-driven security in the context of service-oriented architecture
and business process modelling. In [6,7] Web Services Access Control Markup
Language (WSACML) has been introduced, an access control meta-model for
service-oriented architecture. WSACML describes policies at the platform in-
dependent level, which means that they are specified with detailed technical
resource descriptions while platform specific details and notations for specific
security products are not covered. Based on this work we have developed the
WSACML2PSSP transformation tool [7], which allows the generation of plat-
form specific security policies out of WSACML policies for commercial products
e.g. CA SiteMinder. In order to cover access control from a business point of
view as well, we describe how business processes can be enriched with security
artefacts to express access control requirements [8]. In a prototypical implemen-
tation, the UML activity diagram has been extended with a UML2 profile for
identity management. To attach access control statements to the business pro-
cess, this extension introduces DraftedPermission and Policy elements. We have
also applied this extension concept to the Business Process Modeling Notation
(BPMN), adapting a BPMN modelling tool to use our extensions within graph-
ical modelling. As the business process model is a computation independent
model from a business point of view, we showed in [9] how this model could
be transformed to a platform independent model, fitting the WSACML meta-
model. In a broader perspective, these developments allow for the generation
of platform specific security policies out of computation independent secured
business process models utilising the WSACML meta-model at the platform in-
dependent level. While these studies strongly focus on specific aspects of access
control, secure business process modelling, and model-driven techniques, a more
general view describing the development process of access control policies as a
whole is still missing. Especially the organisation of the development process
and its environment like roles, artefacts of the single phases and the utilisation
of tools is still not adequately shown in a comprehensive view.
As far as related work is concerned, the management of model-driven security
is taken into focus in [10]. The authors make use of model-driven security for
service-oriented architectures in order to cope with the steady change of appli-
cations and with the error-prone administration of security polices, introducing
the OpenPMF framework. Some technical details of the framework are shown,
but no concept of a model-driven development process for security policies is
presented. In addition, there is no discussion of organisational aspects which
are necessary to generate security policies in a model-driven way. Rees et al.
introduce PFIRES, a policy framework for interpreting risk in e-business secu-
rity in [11]. This framework is dedicated to high level policy management and
it describes a policy life-cycle which is aligned with the software development
process. The paper gives an overview on policy management and its phases from
a global perspective, but it does not address a specific implementation scenario,
where access control policies are developed to secure e.g. a business process. In
[12], Rodr´ıguez et al. present M-BPSec, a method for security requirements elic-
itation for business processes. Their four-phase method is decoupled from the
software development process of functional components. As the method ends
with the transformation of a secure business process into analysis-classes and
use case diagrams, the creation of platform specific security policies is beyond the
scope of this approach and there is no description of artefacts, tools, and roles
covering organisational aspects. In [13] Nagaratnam et al. describe a method
for business-driven application security. They introduce different roles involved
in the software development process, as well as the tools used and show how
an application may be brought from the analysis phase to operation: The inte-
gration of security requirements starts with the modelling of security intentions
within business process models, which are understandable from a business per-
spective. Specific security requirements may be specified later on, e.g. in a UML
class diagram. In contrast to our approach, the authors do not propagate a full
model-driven development process for access control policies. Limiting the busi-
ness view to modelling security intentions neglects the fact that many security
requirements are driven by business needs which means that the business should
have knowledge of them. The suggested use of tools is focused on a single vendor
and does not comprise tools that specifically support the development of security
policies.
3 Organisational Aspects – Roles, Tools and Artefacts
The model-driven development of access control policies is not just a simple se-
quence of single steps which have to be processed, it is also a complex process
which involves different roles, tools and artefacts. Roles organise employees ac-
cording to their responsibility in the enterprise. A variety of tools is utilised to
support the development process. Artefacts of different kind are used as input
data or are created as output within single steps of the development process. This
section gives an overview on these aspects before the model-driven development
process for access control policies is introduced in the following section.
3.1 Roles Involved in the Development Process
The following roles in the development process are discussed below:
– Process Owner
– Business Analyst
– Security Architect
– Security Developer
– Security Administrator
The process owner possesses the business process and is often represented by
an organisational unit, not necessarily by a single person. From a business point
of view he is in charge of the business process. His interest is to support his
business by utilising the business process, therefore he is the source for improve-
ment requests to satisfy business requirements. The process owner has a deep
knowledge of all business-related aspects regarding the business process and he
knows which laws or regulations have to be followed. He is able to clarify who is
allowed to use the business process, a precondition for formulating access control
requirements.
The business analyst is the interface between business-related and IT depart-
ments. He is experienced in business process modelling (BPM) and knows which
business requirements can be successfully realised with the help of the IT. A deep
understanding of the business domain with its requirements and characteristics
enables him to link business and IT views of the problems involved.
The security architect has expertise in IT security architectures, especially in
identity management and the modelling of access control policies. He is able to
understand the non-formalised DraftedPermission elements and resolves them
into formalised Policy elements. After that he will check whether all Policy ele-
ments are attached to the business process in a reasonable way and, if necessary,
he will fix misconceptions and modelling errors.
The security developer is a security expert focusing on the implementation
of platform specific access control policies. The security developer is respon-
sible for generating WSACML policies out of Policy elements with the help of
the PE2WSACML transformation tool (see sec. 3.3 for the discussion of tools in-
volved in our approach). He has to resolve warnings and errors which are thrown
during the transformation process and has to link the generated WSACML poli-
cies to service operations within the company’s service-oriented architecture. In
order to use the access control policies in a commercial product, the security
developer creates product specific access control policies with the help of the
WSACML2PSSP transformation tool.
The security administrator is in charge of the security infrastructure’s oper-
ation, i.e. he is monitoring the systems, installing product updates, deploying
and updating access control policies as well as solving problems with the security
infrastructure. He has to ensure that new deployments of policies will not cause
problems in the production environment and that the import of these updates
will be successfully distributed in the company’s security infrastructure.
3.2 Artefacts in the Development Process
The DraftedPermission element contains access control statements in a non-
formalised and possibly incomplete manner. It enables the business site to de-
scribe their desired access control behaviour in prose which has to be refactored
into Policy elements later. In order to use the DraftedPermission element within
business process modelling, we have extended the Unified Modeling Language
(UML) activity diagram and the Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN).
The DraftedPermission element has been introduced in [8], and further informa-
tion can be found in [9].
The Policy element contains formalised access control statements. Attributes
for describing their compliance and security status ease the handling of them.
Policy elements are reusable, i.e. it is intended to reuse formerly defined policies
when access control requirements reappear in another business scenario. The
Policy element has been proposed in [8,9].
WSACML policies are based on an access control meta-model for web service-
oriented architectures which has been introduced in [6]. WSACML describes
access control policies at a platform independent level, i.e. they are specified
with detailed technical resource descriptions: For example, the service operation
to be protected is specified, but platform specific details on security issues and
notations for security products are not covered.
Platform specific security policies are policies for a certain product, e.g. for
a commercial off the shelf product. They describe access control requirements
in the product’s vocabulary. Platform specific security policies can be in a pro-
prietary or standardised format like XACML; but as of 2009 most commercial
products are not fully standard compliant.
The security-enriched business process model is described in an extended
BPMN notation, supporting the annotation of security relevant information. The
security-enriched business process model has its position at the beginning of the
development process for access control policies which means that some work
on securing the process has already been completed while other steps are still
missing. The model has (formal) Policy elements attached to it, but also Draft-
edPermission elements containing security requirements written in prose which
have to be resolved in a later phase. The business process model is enriched with
access control statements but needs manual refinement for completely supporting
a model-driven generation of access control policies.
The secured business process model in BPMN notation contains formalised
Policy elements only. It is created out of the security-enriched business process
model after all DraftedPermission elements are resolved into Policy elements.
The business process model itself is the platform independent starting point
for a model-driven development process resulting in the generation of platform
specific access control policies for a commercial product.
3.3 Tools and Repositories Supporting the Development Process
Based on the process model sketched above we have developed a number of mod-
elling and transformation tools which support the mda-based creation of access
control policies. At the same time, relevant artefacts are stored in repositories
which are used in the policy transformation process. Both, tools and repositories
are described below.
BPMN modelling tools support the modelling of business processes. The tools
provide all BPMN elements, check whether they are assembled in a correct way or
support the graphical arrangement of model elements. In order to use a BPMN
modelling tool for modelling access control requirements within the business
process, the tool has to support an extension mechanism to include new elements
like DraftedPermission or Policy.
A business object repository stores enterprise-wide entities like order, cus-
tomer or contract which are used to describe input or output data for different
activities. Each department within the enterprise has a different view on those
entities. For example, the sales department defines a customer as a person who
has already ordered a product, whereas the marketing department defines a cus-
tomer as a person that should be convinced to place an order. As potentially
contradictory views can cause difficulties in the modelling of business processes,
the representation of the business object should be stored in a business object
repository which includes all aspects of the entity within the enterprise. We de-
veloped it as a directory which supports the search for existing business objects
and its attributes to utilise and interpret them in business process modelling.
The vocabulary repository was designed in order to support the creation of
access control policies. The formal description of policies ensures syntactic cor-
rectness, but the wrong usage of attributes, e.g. the usage of non-existent at-
tributes will lead to semantically invalid policies. To overcome this weakness,
the vocabulary repository contains all attributes which may be used. These are
for example business roles, environment attributes, names of existing services
and service operations. When a policy has to be created, all attributes used can
be looked up in the vocabulary repository. In addition, during transformations
of policies all attributes are checked as well.
The policy repository contains formal security Policy elements which are al-
ready used in modelled business processes. The computation independent poli-
cies are stored in an XML representation we have proposed in [9]. We designed
the policy repository to support the reuse of policies within the business pro-
cess model in case of identical security requirements. As some access control
policies reoccur frequently in different business processes, the reuse of existing
policies not only saves work but also contributes to increased security as the
policies stored in the policy repository have been reviewed by security experts
beforehand. The policy repository is searchable so that policies fitting the user’s
requirements can be looked up. Meta-data fields describe the policy’s content as
well as security and compliance aspects.
The WSACML policy repository stores platform independent WSACML poli-
cies. For every policy to be stored in the repository, the tool checks whether the
policy should be created or whether existing one should be updated. WSACML
policies are platform independent but already linked to service operations, for
example. The WSACML repository gives an overall view on access control state-
ments for a certain service operation, as only WSACML policies are linked to
entities of the IT systems architecture.
The PE2WSACML transformation tool extracts Policy elements (PE) out of
a secured business process model and transforms them into WSACML policies.
During the transformation process it utilises the vocabulary repository in order
to check whether all attributes used within the policies exist and are used in
a correct way. Failures that are detected during this check are displayed as
warnings and error messages and have to be corrected in the secured business
process model afterwards, before rerunning the transformation.
Platform independent WSACML policies have to be transformed to plat-
form specific policies by the WSACML2PSSP transformation tool in order to
be used by a commercial security product. This tool handles the meta-model of
WSACML as well as the meta-models of all supported security products. Trans-
formation rules between WSACML and the target product describe in which
way the content of WSACML policies is mapped to the elements of the prod-
uct’s platform specific policies. This approach allows the generation of arbitrary
platform specific policies as only the mapping rules to the new meta-model have
to be reengineered. A specific example for this mapping has been given for CA
SiteMinder in [7].
The policy import tool is a generic name for the mechanism to import plat-
form specific security policies in a certain security product. Depending on the
product the import of new or updated policies works in different ways. Some
tools provide an interface allowing the import of policies by loading them into
the product. Other products need a customised policy import tool, developed
with the product’s specific application programming interface (API). A policy
import tool in the context of CA SiteMinder is used in [7].
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between transformation steps, repositories and
modelling and transformation tools.
4 Model-driven Development of Access Control Policies
In analogy with the software development process, the model-driven development
process for access control policies has four phases. It starts with the modelling
of the business process and its access control requirements and ends with the de-
ployment of platform specific security policies within the IT security architecture
of the enterprise. Focusing on the model-driven development of access control
policies, functional aspects within the different phases are not shown in detail
below. For every phase within the development process we describe specific ac-
tivities and the roles performing them, the artefacts required and produced, like
documents or models, and the tools employed. The roles are examples for the
job function the persons carry. They are heavily dependant on the organisational
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structure of the enterprise. Table 1 gives an overview of roles, artefacts, and tools
involved in our approach to model-driven development of access control policies.
4.1 The Analysis Phase
The analysis phase begins with the definition of details regarding the business
process. This is done by the process owners in collaboration with a business an-
alyst. As soon as all facts and requirements are collected, the business process is
modelled in a computation independent way, e.g. in the Business Process Mod-
eling Notation (BPMN). In order to ease the handling of business objects during
modelling, the business object repository can be utilised. As access control re-
quirements are driven by business needs, the team should try to collect them in
this early stage of the development process and attach them to the business pro-
cess model. This can be done either in the form of DraftedPermission elements
(see sec. 3.2 above) or by reusing Policy elements from the policy repository. Util-
ising the process owners’ knowledge on access control restrictions within their
domain and coupling them with the business process model will ensure that all
security requirements are covered during the development process. The result of
the analysis phase is a security-enriched business process model including formal
as well as non-formal access control requirements specified from a business point
of view.
Table 1. Roles, Tools and Artefacts within the Development Process
Phases
Ana. Des. Impl. Depl.
Roles
Process Owners x
Business Analyst x
Security Architect x
Security Developer x x
Security Administrator x
Artefacts
DraftedPermission Elements x x
Policy Elements x x
WSACML Policies x x
Platform Specific Security Policies x x
Security-enriched Business Process Model x x
Secured Business Process Model x
Tools
BPMN Modelling Tool x x
Business Object Repository x x
Policy Repository x x
Vocabulary Repository x
WSACML Policy Repository x
PE2WSACML Transformation Tool x
WSACML2PSSP Transformation Tool x
Policy Import Tool x
4.2 The Design Phase
In the design phase, the output of the analysis phase (i.e., a computation indepen-
dent model (CIM)) is the basis for the development of the platform independent
model (PIM). Tasks defined in the business process model have to be mapped
to existing service operations or to service operations that have to be created.
As the functional development process goes beyond the scope of this paper,
the necessary steps will not be described; for further information on this proce-
dure we refer to [14]. From a security point of view DraftedPermission elements
within the business process model have to be transformed to formalised Policy
elements. This will be done by a security architect. At this point all DraftedPer-
mission elements have to be resolved and the business process is designed from
an IT perspective. The resulting artefact is the secured business process model
and all Policy elements are stored in the policy repository. As a next step, the
generation of platform independent WSACML policies can be done by the secu-
rity developer using the PE2WSACML transformation tool, which reads policies
from the secured business process model and transforms them into WSACML
policies which are stored in the WSACML policy repository, at the same time
unifying all WSACML policies linked to the same service operation. During the
transformation process the attributes used within the policies are validated us-
ing the vocabulary repository and the business object repository to ensure that
only valid attributes and values are used. Warnings and errors thrown by the
transformation tool have to be corrected by the security developer. As a last step
the manual mapping of the business process task names to service operations has
to be done which assigns the WSACML policy to a specific service operation.
4.3 The Implementation Phase
As companies employ security products from a broad number of vendors, plat-
form specific security policies e.g. for CA SiteMinder or IBM Tivoli Access
Manager must be generated. The WSACML2PSSP transformation tool oper-
ated by the security developer uses WSACML policies as input and generates
platform specific security policies. The transformation runs automatically and
there is no need for manual rework or adaption. All plausibility checks on the at-
tributes used within the policies have already been done in the design phase. The
WSACML2PSSP transformation tool uses mapping rules to map the meta-model
of WSACML to the meta-model of the platform specific policies. Parallel to the
product specific policy generation, the implementation of functional components
like services, the portal frontend or the database layer is done by developers.
4.4 The Deployment Phase
Finally, the platform specific security policies are delivered to the security ad-
ministrator for deployment. All artefacts which have no direct relation to the
system’s security like the implemented services or the contents of are portal are
handled separately. With the help of the policy import tool, the generated plat-
form specific security policies are imported into the security product. In general,
new policies are imported directly whereas existing but changed policies are
only updated. The security product will audit this changes within the policies
for ensuring traceability.
5 Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper, we have described a model-driven development process for access
control policies which is organised in four phases just like the traditional software
development process (analysis, design, implementation, deployment). While we
have described the development and application of the tools used in this process
to concrete scenarios in previous work, we have focused on the overall struc-
ture of the access control policy development process and the tools’ role as well
as their interaction with the enterprise security infrastructure here. The mda-
based approach results in a unified process for developing access control policies
which helps bridging communication gaps between business and IT perspectives.
At the same time, this streamlined development model may also make security
development more efficient. A real business scenario for applying the proposed
development process of access control policies is the opening of a current account
in the banking domain. The business department models the business process
and adds additional access control information. Refining them results in the
secured business process model, from which all necessary information can be
extracted, so that WSACML policies and later product specific security policies
for e.g. CA SiteMinder can be generated. A comprehensive version of this sce-
nario is currently in progress and will be published in future work. Further work
will be done on the integration of enterprise-wide compliance regulations within
the development of access control policies as well as on methods to improve and
measure the business process’s security quality during its life cycle.
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